Laserfiche WebLink
regulations, beginning with their temporary sign standards and regulations, so as to make the <br />necessary changes to conform with the holding in Reed; and <br />WHEREAS, the City of Casselberry recognizes that under established Supreme Court <br />precedent, commercial speech may be subject to greater restrictions than noncommercial speech <br />and that doctrine is true for both temporary signs as well as for permanent signs; and <br />WHEREAS, the City of Casselberry finds and determines that under Florida law, <br />whenever a portion of a statute or ordinance is declared unconstitutional, the remainder of the act <br />will be permitted to stand provided: (1) the unconstitutional provisions can be separated from the <br />remaining valid provisions; (2) the legislative purpose expressed in the valid provisions can be <br />accomplished independently of those which are void; (3) the good and the bad features are not so <br />inseparable in substance that it can be said that the legislative body would have passed the one <br />without the other; and (4) an act complete in itself remains after the valid provisions are stricken <br />[see, e.g., Waldrup v. Dugger, 562 So. 2d 687 (Fla. 1990)]; and <br />WHEREAS, the City of Casselberry finds and determines that objects and devices such <br />as graveyard and cemetery markers visible from a public area, vending machines or express mail <br />drop-off boxes visible from a public area, decorations that do not constitute advertising visible <br />from a public area, artwork that does not constitute advertising, a building's architectural <br />features visible from a public area, or a manufacturer's or seller's markings on machinery or <br />equipment visible from a public area are not within the scope of what is intended to be regulated <br />through "land development" regulations that pertain to signage under Chapter 163 of the Florida <br />Statutes; and <br />WHEREAS, the City of Casselberry finds and determines that the aforesaid objects and <br />devices are commonly excluded or exempted from being regulated as signs in land development <br />regulations and sign regulations, and that extending a regulatory regime to such objects or <br />devices would be inconsistent with the free speech clause of the First Amendment; and <br />WHEREAS, the City of Casselberry finds and determines that it should continue to <br />prohibit discontinued signs regardless of whether or not there was any intent to abandon the sign; <br />and <br />WHEREAS, the City of Casselberry finds and determines that a traffic control device <br />sign, exempt from regulation under the City's land development regulations for signage, is any <br />government sign located within the right-of-way that functions as a traffic control device and that <br />is described and identified in the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices (MUTCD) and <br />approved by the Federal Highway Administrator as the National Standard, and according to the <br />MUTCD traffic control device signs include those signs that are classified and defined by their <br />function as regulatory signs (that give notice of traffic laws or regulations), warning signs (that <br />give notice of a situation that might not readily be apparent), and guide signs (that show route <br />designations, directions, distances, services, points of interest, and other geographical, <br />recreational, or cultural information); and <br />WHEREAS, the City of Casselberry finds and determines that it is appropriate to <br />prohibit certain vehicle signs similar to the prohibition suggested in Article VIII (Signs) of the <br />